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Over the course of the nineteenth century, American settlers spread throughout the 
Western frontier, driving out indigenous populations to establish unique and permanent 
homelands of their own. In doing so, they caused the death and displacement of 
thousands of Plains Indians, including the Dakota people in the young state of Minnesota 
in 1862. Indeed, the US-Dakota War represented a salient instance of settler colonial 
expansion on the frontier, triggering a bloody conflict between the Dakota Sioux and 
American military expeditions led by Henry H. Sibley. This paper attempts to 
contextualize this war within the broader framework of settler colonialism and examines 
the white settlers’ rhetoric of exclusion that validated the mass hanging and dispossession 
of the Dakota people. Equally important, this paper examines the settler colonial 
enterprise in Palestine since the rise of Zionism until around the 1967 War. It looks at a 
body of Zionist settler colonial practices in Palestine in tandem with the tragedy of 
Lydda––the very epicenter of the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1948. This is not, however, to 
essentialize both historical experiences, it certainly tends to highlight few practices of 
settler colonialism in America and Israel such as the discursive strategy of exclusion 
cloaked within Dakota ‘heathenism’ and ‘savagery’ and Zionist “obsessional imperative” 
of being ethnically pure to the detriment of thousands of Palestinian Arabs.1 It is beyond 
this paper’s scope to deliver parochial tablets; rather it tends to explore the underpinnings 
and practices of settler colonialism on the Dakota and the Palestinian peoples. Two cases 
different in time and space, but they share certain psychodynamics of settler colonialism. 
                                                 
1 Lorenzo Veracini. Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010): 61.   
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                                              Introduction 
If the 1948 Arab-Israeli War marked the first chapter of a military series of land 
annexation of Israeli settler colonialism, the 1862 US-Dakota War in the young state of 
Minnesota continued to ignite the American Western frontier and did not end until 1890 
with the ill-famed Battle of Wounded Knee in South Dakota. This Dakota-Palestinians 
parallel remains scarcely understudied and typically shares patterns of settler colonialism. 
In filling the gap, this work examines the Dakota War of 1862, also known as the 1862 
Minnesota Massacre, as a glaring example of the battle on the frontier between the 
settlers, the state, and the Dakota people. The conflict symbolizes the constant demands 
for Indian lands made by westward-moving settlers and consequent treaties to “legalize” 
the land take-overs. It equally depicts a decisive battleground for the Dakotas as a 
beguiling dream of the return to their ancestral lands.  
To interpret the valid use of violence against the existing anti-Indian feelings, I 
examine the reports of Henry Hastings Sibley, First State Governor of Minnesota (1858-
1860) and a U.S. Representative of the Minnesota Territory. I also examine Governor 
Alexander Ramsey’s letters to Abraham Lincoln; the reports of Morton S. Wilkinson, the 
Republican Senator from Minnesota (1859-1865); and Gen. John Pope, the commander 
of the new department who was sent to Minnesota to quell the Sioux uprising. In 
addition, I look at Alfred Sully, the colonel of the 1st Minnesota Volunteer Infantry on 
February 3, 1862 and later brigadier general on September 26, 1862, whose troops 
destroyed a village of some 500 tipis in the field of Tah-kah-o-ku-ty. These reports and 
primary sources embody a discursive strategy of settler colonialism to purge the Dakotas 
2 
 
from an expanding settlers’ body created by the boundaries of the new state of 
Minnesota, which is a Dakota word for “clear water.”  
Equally important, this paper examines Israel’s settler colonial structures in Palestine 
since the rise of Zionism as well as its tactics and its practices during the 1948 and 1967 
wars. It focuses on specific cases of a settler colonial paradigm such as the discursive 
strategy of dispossession, cultural effacement, legal appropriation and how the latter 
“reaffirm[ed] a sort of Zionist manifest destiny.”2  It also historicizes the massacre of 
Lydda (Lod, al-Lud) during the 1948 Palestine War (Israeli War of Independence) within 
the broader frame of settler colonialism. The expulsion of a full one-tenth of the Arab 
exodus from the towns of Lydda and Ramle in July 1948 “was the largest operation of its 
kind in the first Israeli-Arab war,” Benny Morris indicated.3 Was there direct evidence of 
a systematic expulsion during “Operation Dani” (Mivtza‘ Dani)? This question and 
others remain integral in the ever-growing body of the historical debate on the 1948 war.  
Our task is to contextualize this conflict and Israel’s colonial practices within a history 
of settler colonialism. This part draws and expands from a body of Israeli and Arab 
primary and secondary resources. For example, I examine reports related to Yigal Allon, 
the IDF General Commander of Operation Dani, his chief lieutenant Yitzhak Rabin’s, 
and commander of the 89th Battalion, Moshe Dayan’s. I also use Spiro Munayyer's 
account, Al-Lud fi 'Ahday al-Intidab wal-Ihtilal [Lydda in both Periods of the Mandate 
                                                 
2 Eugène L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim (eds.). “The” War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 2. 
3 Benny Morris, “Operation Dani and the Palestinian Exodus from Lydda and Ramle in 1948,” Middle East 
Journal, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Winter 1986), 82. 
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and the Occupation], as one of the very few detailed eye-witness accounts that exists 
from the point of view of an ordinary Palestinian layman.4  
That being said, the present study does not purport to be a complete history of the 
young states of Minnesota and Israel, but rather a sketch of few politics of settler 
colonialism and their aftermath implications. The writing is organized into three main 
layers intersecting and interlocking with the general context of settler colonial studies. 
Chapter one addresses the concept of settler colonialism, its historical scholarship, its 
logic of dispossession and practices of appropriation. Chapter two examines the rhetoric 
behind the 1862 Minnesota Massacre (U.S-Dakota War) as it encapsulates a central part 
of the U.S. settler colonial paradigm on the American frontier. Chapter three investigates 
the philosophy of Zionism/Israel, its practices of settler colonialism and its infliction on 
the Palestinian Arabs, particularly during the 1948 and the 1967 wars. The conclusion 
brings both cases into a comparative approach and looks at the practices of both settler 
colonial experiences and their implications on the indigenes—the Dakota and the 
Palestinians. In a nutshell, the central arguments of this paper are framed by the global 
history of settler colonialism, a relatively recent and cutting-edge field of historical 
inquiry. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Spiro Munayyer. “The Fall of Lydda.” Journal of Palestine Studies. Vol. 17, No. 4 (Summer 1998), 80-
98. 
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Chapter One: Settler Colonialism & Logic of Exclusion 
Settler colonialism is being unable to fill in the blanks. It is the history of a family welded 
together by natives and settlers. It is the logic of superiority, of primacy, of genocide. It is 
the colonization of memory and of events that come to be known as “History”.5  
 
Settler colonialism refers to a history in which the settlers drove indigenous 
populations from their land in order to create their own national or ethnic communities.6 
Under colonialism, the colonizers go out to the colonies, usurp the land, exploit their 
resources as if by right and eventually return home. Under settler colonialism, there is no 
return home, the colonizers come to stay and occupy the land permanently. In other 
words, they want the indigenes “to vanish,” but sometimes they exploit them before their 
disappearance, and “other times they replace them,” as theorist Patrick Wolfe explains.7 
This applies to Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Canada, the 
United States and Israel.  
In the United States, settler colonialism has taken the form of military, institutional, 
cultural (forced assimilation through boarding schools) and legal policies (treaties) aimed 
at eliminating and subordinating Indian tribes over the short and long term. The Dakota 
people began to challenge the colonial rule more forcefully, eventually engaging in direct 
warfare against the settlers and the U.S government in 1862. The aftermath of this settler 
colonial war resulted in mass hanging, imprisonment, forced depopulation, and starvation 
and thus the destruction of the Dakota community. In Israel, Zionist settler colonialism 
has taken similar forms of policies to expel thousands of Palestinians from their land in 
the two wars of 1948 and 1967. Despite differences in time and space, the concerted 
                                                 
5 Maya Mikdashi. “What is Settler Colonialism?”  Jadaliya. (Jul 17, 2012). 
6 Walter L. Hixson. American Settler Colonialism: A History. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 4. 
7 Patrick Wolfe. Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: The Poetics of an 
Ethnographic Event. (London: Cassell, 1999), 2. 
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efforts of white settlers in Minnesota and in Palestine “resemble one another in several 
respects [and are] not a consequence of conscious imitation,” Lynette Russell explains, 
“but of separate efforts to resolve very similar problems,”—how to deal with violent 
indigenous resistance in contestation for colonial space.8  
In this respect, settler colonial studies facilitate comparative analysis that features 
histories evolving at different places and at different times. A phenomenon that replicates 
globally and remains as much a thing of the past as a thing of the present.9 What 
primarily distinguishes settler colonialism in Minnesota and Palestine from colonialism 
proper is that settlers came not to exploit the indigenous population for economic gain, 
but rather to remove them from colonial space. They sought to “construct communities 
bounded by ties of ethnicity and faith,” Caroline Elkins and Susan Pederson point out.10 
Settlers in Minnesota and Israel created a culturally imagined and legally sanctioned 
relationship with the land. For example, terms such as “frontier” and a “Jewish 
homeland” establish emotional attachment to the new space.11 Military leaders in both 
Minnesota and in Palestine “wished less to govern indigenous peoples or to enlist them in 
their economic ventures than to seize their land and push them beyond an ever-expanding 
frontier of settlement.”12 Preeminent theorist of settler colonialism Lorenzo Veracini 
succinctly notes, “Settler colonial projects are specifically interested in turning 
indigenous peoples into refugees.”13 
                                                 
8 Lynette Russell, ed. Colonial Frontiers: Indigenous-European Encounters in Settler Societies. 
(Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2001), 3.  
9 Edward Cavanagh & Lorenzo Veracini (2013): “Editors statement”. Settler Colonial Studies, 3:1,1.1  
10 Caroline Elkins and Susan Pederson, eds. Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century. (New York: 
Routledge, 2005), 2. 
11 Walter L. Hixson. American Settler Colonialism: A History. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 6. 
12 Elkins and Pederson, 2. 
13 Lorenzo Veracini. Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 
35; See also “Settler Colonialism,” South Atlantic Quarterly, 107, 4. (Special edition, Fall 2008). 
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In the end, settler colonialism is a zero-sum contest; a winner-take-all project and 
would accept nothing less than the removal of the Dakota and the Palestinian Arabs to 
cobble the settler’s indigeneity. Settlers in Minnesota and Israel established “facts on the 
ground” through mass immigrations, “to scout for prospects and to squat,” John Weaver 
points out.14 Masses of settlers brought modernity with them—building roads, bridges, 
railroads, factories, towns and cities, nevertheless mowing indigenous cultures in the 
process. The migrants destroyed, crippled, swamped most of the numerous societies they 
encountered, and created new societies at an astonishing pace.15 Yet, if the indigenes 
failed to embrace the ‘arts’ of settlers’ civilization, then a lethal tropes of racial 
inferiority, indigenous savagery and ineptitude are used to validate ethnic cleansing 
campaigns.  
In colonial textual ingredients of settler colonialism in Minnesota and Palestine, 
indigenes’ identities were formulated as a chameleon-like feature that required constant 
repetition and affirmation in order to assert them as being real. In this line of thought, 
Aimé Césaire in Discourse of Colonialism (1950) explained how the colonizer destroys 
the identity of the colonized through “thingification” (“chosification”). Both the Dakota 
and the Palestinians are conceptually perceived as a “thing”—without a core existence on 
their lands. Following Césaire’s argument, Albert Memmi emphasized that the colonized 
people were perpetually degraded and kept a separate entity, precluding the creation of a 
new settler society.16 Homi Bhaba destabilized this allegorical Manichean between the 
colonizer and the colonized since the former depended on the latter to construct his own 
                                                 
14 John C. Weaver. The Great Land Rush and The Making of the Modern World, 1650-1900. (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003), 12.  
15 James Belich. Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo World, 1783-
1939. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 558. 
16 Albert Memmi. The Colonizer and the Colonized. (Boston, MA: The Beacon Press, 1965), 88-89.  
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identity. Both are seen through “malleable” relations—settlers are white and civilized and 
indigenes are brown and savage.17  
The Dakota were perceived as “heathens” even though many white settlers, 
particularly Indian sympathizers like Sara Wakefield condemned treaty violations and 
aggression against the Dakota. Settlers, arriving in massive numbers in Minnesota, 
assumed entitlement to the land and demanded total security from the threat of the 
Dakota resistance. The Dakota presence destabilized white settlers’ access to land and so 
the settlers’ “logic of exclusion” straightforwardly furthered a “racial classification” that 
validates an indiscriminate violence aimed at fulfilling the self-serving vision of Indians 
as a “dying race.”18 The frontier, including the Dakota land, became feminized, a space 
characterized as a naked woman exposed to white settlers’ gaze, and presented a promise 
of effortless access. This coherent discursive strategy of feminization, eroticization and 
cannibalism echoes the gender power relation that requires Henry Sibley, traders and 
Indian agents’ intervention to redeem the pristine land of the young state of Minnesota. 
Concurrently, as a national movement, Zionism is heavily laden with Eurocentric 
notions of racial superiority, progress, and providential destiny which propelled a land 
rush in Palestine to be “unstoppable.”19 Having imagined powerful connections to 
Palestine, Jewish settlers, although they purchased major parts of the land, defended the 
land of Zion in 1948 violently and at all costs, continued to conquer and inherit the 
wilderness in 1967. Their ultimate goal is to “bring about the return to Zion” and morph 
the “Chosen people” into a “normal people”, and from the ills of the diaspora into their 
                                                 
17 Homi Bhaba. The Location of Culture. (New York: Routledge, 1994), 112. 
18 Wolfe, 388.                         
19 Weaver. The Great Land Rush and The Making of the Modern World, 1650-1900. (Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2003), 5. 
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own Jewish state.20 In doing so, Palestinian existence laid outside Jewish conceptions of a 
state of Israel. The way leading figures of Zionism conceived, imagined and framed 
Palestine in their campaigns of land rush, turned the indigenes ‘invisible’. The orientalist 
reproach of invisibility, statelessness and nomadism “renders” the Palestinians 
“removable,” Patrick Wolfe indicates. It is ‘territoriality’ that remains settler 
colonialism’s specific, irreducible element, not race or religion, ethnicity, grade of 
civilization, etc.”21 This racial superiority establishes and maintains a colonial authority 
over the land as the Palestinians disappear slowly in favor of the colonial settlers. The 
land, henceforth, shall “belong by natural right to that power which understands its value 
and is willing to turn it into account,” as David Spurr concurred.22  
     Although the next chapter is on a tragic war on the American frontier, the 1862 Dakota 
war is a microcosm of a long nineteenth century Westward expansion of the United 
States in that it “connects deeply, extensively, and reciprocally with land-taking and land-
allocation episodes in the histories of British settlement colonies,” Weaver points out.23 
Israel, on the other hand, was not a product of British settler colonialism like the United 
States, but it was a product of a national movement backed by Britain and later the 
United States. The settlers had to naturalize a new historical record while displacing the 
indigenous past because indigeneity required not only taking over the land, either through 
killing or removing, but also a sanitized historical narrative as well. This could be seen 
                                                 
20 Aviezer Ravitzky. Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Religious Radicalism. (University of Chicago Press, 
1996), 10. 
21 Wolfe, 396. 
22 David Spurr. The Rhetoric of Empire: Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing, and Imperial 
Administration. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 156. 
23 Weaver, Great Land Rush, 18-19. 
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later in the next two chapters about settler colonial conflicts like the 1862 US-Dakota war 
and the 1948 Lydda massacre in the Arab-Israeli War.  
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Chapter Two: The Dakota-US War of 1862: A Settler Colonial War 
 “The cries of the victims of the Indian massacre and the yells of their fiendish 
assailants were lost in the thunders of the Second Manassas, South Mountain and 
Perryville; the smoke of the savage burnings in Minnesota was obscured by the powder 
clouds of a score of Southern battlefields.”24 Thus spoke Charles D. Gilfillan, the first 
president of the Minnesota Valley Historical Society in 1895, of the outbreak of the 1862 
Minnesota War. In the years between 1861 and 1865, the United States Army faced a 
second front often neglected in historical accounts of this tragic period of American 
history. The first major and unexpected attack from western Indian tribes during the Civil 
War came in 1862, in Minnesota. Governor Alexander Ramsey telegraphed President 
Lincoln: “This is not our war,” he said; “it is a national war… More than five hundred 
whites have been murdered by the Indians.”25  
  The 1862 Dakota War was more of a reaction to a series of problems—the ever-
increasing white settlement in the Minnesota River Valley, the violation of terms of 
treaties, the deficiency to feed the roughly six thousand Dakotans on the reservation. 
Tensions were already high when four young Santee men, out hunting on August 17, 
1862, broke into the village of Acton, Minnesota, stole some eggs from a local farmer, 
and murdered five white settlers. This incident triggered great panic on the frontier. The 
Mdewakanton chief Little Crow soon became the recognized leader of the rebellion, as 
“long years of exploitation and injustice had bred a deep resentment among the Dakota 
                                                 
24 Sketches, historical and descriptive, of the monuments and tablets erected by the Minnesota Valley 
Historical Society in Renville and Redwood counties, Minnesota. (Morton: Minnesota Valley Historical 
Society, 1902), 4. 
25 “Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress.” Transcribed and Annotated by the Lincoln Studies 
Center, Knox College. Galesburg, Illinois. Alexander Ramsey to Abraham Lincoln, Saturday, September 
06, 1862. (Telegram concerning affairs in Minnesota). 
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tribesmen along the frontier,” as William B. Hesseltine noted. “When this resentment 
came to a head, strong bands of red men attacked the white settlements.”26  This outbreak 
was one of a series of Indian wars on the Northern Plains that continued to ignite the 
frontier and did not end until 1890 with the ill-famed Massacre of Wounded Knee in 
South Dakota. To illustrate the disastrous magnitude of the Dakota War, John G. Nicolay, 
one of President Lincoln’s private secretaries, noted on a treaty-making assignment in 
Minnesota, that from “the days of King Philip to the time of Black Hawk, there has 
hardly been an outbreak so treacherous, so sudden, so bitter, and so bloody, as that which 
filled the State of Minnesota with sorrow and lamentation.”27 
 Like major historical events, this war is often tempting for historians to look back and 
make judgments on the actions or the causes of the war. Different histories emerged out 
of this war. Early histories, for example, ricocheted off the dominant views of the time: 
that white people had a God-given right to the land, and that native people were “heathen 
savages” in contrast to the bearers of a “true civilization”. Harriet Bishop, a St. Paul 
resident who started the city’s first school in Minnesota, explained in 1864 that the major 
cause of the war was a “divine intervention” and that the Indians went to war because 
they had fallen in league with the “devil.”28 Charles S. Bryant’s book, A History of the 
Great Massacre by the Sioux Indians, in Minnesota (1864) described the “massacre” as 
the “result of a conspiracy long cherished by the great chief, Little Crow.”29 Overall, the 
                                                 
26 William B. Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), 275. 
27 Theodore C. Blegen, ed., Lincoln's Secretary Goes West: Two Reports by John G. Nicolay on Frontier Indian 
Troubles 1862 (La Crosse, Wis., 1965), 45.  
28  Harriet E. Bishop, Dakota War Whoop: or, Indian Massacres and War in Minnesota, of 1862-3 (New York: WM. J. 
Moses’ Press, 1864), 66. 
29 Charles S. Bryant, Abel B. Murch, A History of the Great Massacre by the Sioux Indians, in Minnesota: Including 
the Personal Narratives of many who Escaped (Cincinnati: Rickey & Carroll, 1864), iv. 
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first accounts of the war focused on the brutality and the atrocities committed by the 
several hundred Dakota who took up arms. 
  On the other hand, Sarah Wakefield, with her physician husband Dr. John L. 
Wakefield, were at Yellow Medicine (Upper Sioux Agency), where the U.S.-Dakota War 
broke out. Upon hearing about the war, Mrs. Wakefield and her two children fled and 
were taken prisoners on their way to Fort Ridgely. A Dakota man named Chaska 
(Wechankwastadonpe) and his family took them under their protection throughout the six 
weeks of battle. He safely returned them at Camp Release after the war. Yet, Chaska 
ended up being among the 38 hanged in Mankato.30 Wakefield insider’s perspective put 
the onus on white settlers, particularly state agents for catalyzing the war; “That our 
people,” she wrote; “not the Indians were to blame. Had they not, for years, been 
suffering? Had they not been cheated unmercifully, and now their money had been 
delayed? ... But they knew no justice but in dealing out death for their wrongs”.31  
  Later accounts of the war reiterated Wakefield’s personal insight. Alexander Berghold, 
a Catholic priest in New Ulm, justified in The Indians’ Revenge, or Days of Horror, 
Some Appalling Events in the History of the Sioux (1891), that the swindles, starvation 
and ill treatment of the Dakota had indeed laid the groundwork for their revolt. “During 
the winter”, he said, “they lose a good many, […] the poor creatures perish from cold and 
starvation.”32 What sets this paper apart from early works is my examination of the 
                                                 
30 Sarah Wakefield. “The Dakota-US War of 1862,” Minnesota Historical Society. (Accessed April 22, 2014). 
31 Sarah F. Wakefield, Six Weeks in the Sioux Tepees: A Narrative of Indian Captivity. With an introduction 
by Julia Namias (Shakopee, Minn.: Argus Books, 1864), 100. 
32 Alexander Berghold, The Indians’ Revenge, or Days of Horror, Some Appalling Events in the History of 
the Sioux (San Francisco: P. J. Thomas Printer, 1891), 55.  
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rhetoric of extermination, or “The Metaphysics of Indian Hating”—where the idea of 
savagism contrasted with the image of the bearers of a “true civilization”.33  
 How did Minnesota White Man’s conception of himself influence both his perception 
of the Dakota people and the subsequent military expeditions against the Sioux? Were 
there connections between the official rhetoric and the public labeling of Indians as “the 
deficient savage”? How did a threatening image of “merciless savages” trying to take 
over the young state of Minnesota, serve to legitimize a policy of extermination? The 
answer to these questions does not intend to engage in “who is to blame” analysis, but 
rather to historicize one of the features of settler colonialism—the rhetoric of 
extermination—during the 1862 Dakota War. So, the primary focus of this chapter is to 
use the concept of settler colonialism as a basis to articulate a principled critique of 
settlers’ colonial policy and how that policy delegitimized the Dakota’s grievances. 
  Settler colonialism is a central dynamic to understand the causes of the Minnesota 
conflict, as westward-moving settlers constantly encroached upon, demanded Indian 
lands and consequently established treaties to “legalize” the land take-overs.34 As 
aforementioned, settler colonialism’s dominant feature is not exploitation but 
replacement—it “destroys to replace.”35 By the early 1860s, the settler-oriented policy of 
“territoriality” continued to dispossess the Sioux. The latter lost practically all of their 
Minnesota lands “except for a ten-mile-wide reservation on the south side of the 
                                                 
33 Harvey Pearce, Savagism and Civilization: A Study of the Indian and the American Mind (California: 
University of California Press, 1988), 245. 
34 Gerald S. Henig, “A Neglect Cause of the Sioux Uprising,” The Minnesota Historical Society. (Fall 
1976): 107. 
35 Wolfe, 388.                         
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Minnesota River from west of New Ulm to Big Stone Lake.”36 The remaining land was 
not a good hunting ground and many suffered from starvation as they were largely 
dependent on the annuities, which were often delayed. In this frame, Wakefield wrote: 
Many days these poor creatures subsisted on a tall grass which they find in the 
marshes, chewing the roots, and eating the wild turnip. They would occasionally shoot a 
muskrat, and with what begging they would do, contrive to steal enough so they could 
live; but I knew that many died from starvation or disease caused by eating improper 
food.37 
 
  Along these politics, the racially-coded rhetoric of anti-Indianism played a dynamic 
role in defining the general sentiment. Hank Cox writes “Minnesota was anti-slavery 
regarding the Negroes, but locally it was more anti-Indian”.38 Using the Manichean 
allegory, the logic of anti-Indianism worked in tandem with a second logic of expansion 
à la mission civilisatrice. The bearers of a “true civilization” contrasted “Indian 
savagism”. In a letter to Abraham Lincoln in 1862, Thaddeus Williams, a doctor from St. 
Paul, wrote: “In the march of civilized humanity across the New World, the lurking 
savage, with lust and vengeance in his heart has ever lurked by the pathway, and 
suspended over the couch of the pioneer the tom-a-hawk and scalping-knife, those 
terrible emblems of savage cruelty and demoniac hatred”.39 The common theme of 
marching westward implicitly designates an inevitable subjugation of all geographical 
and human obstacles. 
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  The settler belief in the powerlessness of the Dakota people provided a cover for a 
colonial authority over the land in favor of the white settlers of Minnesota. The idea of 
the Indian, being the “deficient savage” did not halt with the war, but continued and 
became reified at the end of the nineteenth century. Charles D. Gilfillan described the 
Indian uprising as follows: “More Indians were engaged, more whites were killed, and 
more property were destroyed than in any other conflicts with the savages since the first 
settlement of this country”.40 The idea of the Sioux “savagism” presented a demiurgic 
impulse to replace a threatening existing society with a new one—white settlers. 
 
I. The Dakota-US War of 1862: An Account of Settler Colonialism 
  Assaults against white settlers began on August 18, when Little Crow led an attack on 
the Lower Sioux Agency. He killed thirty-one, including James W. Lynd, a husband of 
two Indian wives, women and children. The Indians lost a young warrior of Hu-sha-sha’s 
band, named Towato, or All Blue.41 Killing women and children, however, seemed to 
oppose chief Little Crow’s belief of protecting the helpless from violence. Addressing his 
soldiers on the second day of the uprising, he said: 
Soldiers and young men, you ought not to kill women and children. Your consciousness 
will reproach you for it hereafter, and make you weak in battle. You were too hasty in 
going into the country. You should have killed only those who have been robbing us for 
so long. Hereafter make war after the manner of white men.42 
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   Like Little Crow, many Indians were forced into the war against their desires due to 
the madness of their misery. After the Battle of Wood Lake in September 1862, many of 
them favored a general massacre of 300 helpless white and mixed blood prisoners. Had 
Little Crow not opposed such proposition, it could have triggered another massacre on 
the frontier. Meanwhile, Captain John S. March urged Lieut. Sheehan, in his letter: “It is 
absolutely necessary that you should return with your command immediately to this Post. 
The Indians are raising hell at the lower Agency. Return as soon as possible.”43  
  In taking revenge, however, Captain March headed with a seventy-eight-man garrison 
toward the Lower Sioux Agency, only to be ambushed in tandem with twenty-three 
soldiers by the Dakotas at the Redwood Ferry.44 Left in command at Fort Ridgely, the 
nineteen-year-old Lieutenant Thomas Gere wrote to Governor Ramsey, “The Indians are 
killing the settlers and plundering the country. Send reinforcements without delay.”45 On 
August 19th, the Dakota, successful in its surprise attacks, continued the insurgency 
against the Lower Sioux agency and white settlers at New Ulm, the nearest white 
settlement to the reservation. The next day, August 20th, the Sioux tried to take over the 
reinforced garrison at Fort Ridgely, but remaining soldiers drove them off. Upon his 
briefing on the uprising, Governor Ramsey, on August 21, telegraphed Secretary of War 
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Edwin Stanton, in which he wrote: “The Sioux Indians on our western border have risen, 
and are murdering men, women and children.”46      
  Consumed by the Civil War, President Lincoln initially did not take any act on the 
uprising in Minnesota.47 His administration was pulled through deep setbacks as General 
Robert E. Lee was about to defeat the second Union army under General Pope. But later, 
on December 1, 1862, in his State of the Union Address, he stated: 
In the month of August last the Sioux Indians in Minnesota attacked the settlements in 
their vicinity with extreme ferocity, killing indiscriminately men, women, and children. 
This attack was wholly unexpected, and therefore no means of defense had been prodded. 
It is estimated that not less than 800 persons were killed by the Indians, and a large 
amount of property was destroyed. How this outbreak was induced is not definitely 
known, and suspicions, which may be unjust, need not to be stated. Information was 
received by the Indian Bureau from different sources about the time hostilities were 
commenced that a simultaneous attack was to be made upon the white settlements by all 
the tribes between the Mississippi River and the Rocky Mountains. The State of 
Minnesota has suffered great injury from this Indian war. A large portion of her territory 
has been depopulated, and a severe loss has been sustained by the destruction of 
property. The people of that State manifest much anxiety for the removal of the tribes 
beyond the limits of the State as a guaranty against future hostilities [emphases added].48 
 
  The usage of the passive voice in “were commenced” and “were killed by the Indians” 
allows President Lincoln to reveal the “savagery” of the Indians and the victimization of 
the white settlers and military generals. In a sense, the passive voice shows the “ferocity” 
of the Indians while it buries the deteriorating living conditions within the context of the 
passage. As one can see, there is no indication precisely of what caused the outbreak. As 
such, without the use of a subject, President Lincoln gave weight of authority to 
statements such as “The people of that State manifest much anxiety for the removal of the 
tribes beyond the limits of the State as a guaranty against future hostilities”. This 
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discursive strategy to feminize the Sioux echoes the gender power relation that requires 
white settlers’ intervention to redeem the pristine land and reestablish order. Lincoln’s 
Speech has indeed important ideological functions as it deletes agency and reifies 
processes of ‘removal’. In other words, his speech derealized and reconstructed the 
Dakota people to fit into a threatening picture in an effort to purge them from an 
expanding social body created by the boundaries of the new white settler society.  
  In the midst of the uprising, on Wednesday, August 27, 1862, Morton S. Wilkinson, 
the Republican Senator from Minnesota (1859-1865), William P. Dole, Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, and John G. Nicolay one of Lincoln's private secretaries, briefed the 
President about the crisis: “We are in the midst of a most terrible & exciting Indian war 
thus far the massacre of innocent white settlers has been fearful a wild panic prevails in 
nearly one half of the state. All are rushing to the frontier to defend settlers.”49 Indian 
assailants on white settlements and Indian agencies did not halt. Few days later, on 
September 2 and 3, 1862, in the battleground of Birch Coulie, the Indians, under Red 
Legs, besieged “a white force of 150 men, composed of newly-recruited volunteers and 
newly organized militia and citizens, including half dozen loyal mixed-blood Indians,” 
for nearly thirty hours.50 The rampage resulted in the murder of 23 white settlers, the 
injury of 45, the killing of 90 horses, and the loss of the tents and much of the other camp 
equipage. The Indians, on the other hand, claimed to have lost two with seven slightly 
wounded.51  
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  As soldiers continued to skirmish with the Sioux, the Lincoln administration had a 
growing conspiratorial concern that Confederate agents might be pulling the strings of the 
uprising. Horace Greeley, the chief editor of the New York Tribune, seemed to believe 
so: “The Sioux have doubtless been stimulated… by white and red villains sent among 
them for this purpose by the Secessionists. They will have effected a temporary diversion 
in favor of the Confederacy, and that is all their concern.”52 These conspiracy fears 
triggered Lincoln to claim Confederate involvement in his State of the Union address to 
Congress in December.53 Yet, Captain Pattee of the 14th Iowa Infantry had a different 
attitude on “who was to blame” and he put the onus on white settlers of Minnesota: “It 
was conceded at last that the white people of Minnesota, but mostly the people near and 
connected with the agency, were responsible for this appalling calamity that chilled the 
blood of the white race of the United States.”54  
  In the meantime, Governor Ramsey, as a second step, appointed his old partner, the 
fifty-year-old General Henry H. Sibley, to command Minnesota’s militia. His first task 
was to rescue Fort Ridgely and the settlers caught up in the conflict. Sibley’s forces 
entered the combat against the Santee. Describing the horrors of the scene, Charles 
Johnston, 6th Minnesota Infantry wrote: “who should describe the horrors and distresses 
witnessed in the march up the Minnesota [River]? The roads were literally lined with 
fugitive settlers, with their families, cattle and household effects, terror-stricken and 
almost entirely unarmed.”55 Charles Watson, serving in the same Infantry, noted in his 
dairies as well: “I have seen a great many things since I left home. I have seen awful 
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sights, men with their heads cut off and their sculls all mashed to pieces.”56 Other 
soldiers’ diaries depicted more grim images. George Doud, 8th Minnesota Infantry served 
with Leonard Aldrich in Company F. described the nearly destroyed town of New Ulm as 
“one complete reck”; a twelve-years-old girl “was found dead scalped and all of her 
garments was torn off from her, women’s breasts cut off and pregnant women with 
unborn babies cut out from the womb.”57 
  The war continued with another disastrous Battle—Bull Run, August 29 and 30th, 
where General John Pope, the head of the department of the Northwest, witnessed 
another humiliating loss. Writing to General in Chief Henry Halleck: “You have no idea 
of the terrible destruction already done and of the panic everywhere. Unless very prompt 
steps are taken these states will be half depopulated before the winter begins.”58 But, 
Sibley, in a six weeks’ campaign, put down the uprising, captured more than a thousand 
Indians, and sentenced three hundred and three to death. 
 
II. Sibley’s Expeditions and the Rhetoric of Extermination 
  Henry Hastings Sibley was at home in Mendota late in the afternoon of August 19, 
1862, when Governor Alexander Ramsey rode up to inform him about the “hostility” of 
the Sioux Indians—the murder and capture of white settlers and the destruction of 
property in the Minnesota River Valley. Sibley accepted that evening to serve as a 
Colonel and Commander of the Indian Expedition.59 On August 20th, Sibley and his 
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troops landed at Shakopee, southwest of Minnesota. Thus began a military campaign—
often termed “The Sibley Campaign”—that would last more than a month before its two 
main goals—defeating the Indians and releasing the captive whites—would be realized.60 
Sibley, a former friend and advocate of Indian rights now faced a daunting task to be 
their conqueror. Accounts on this military expedition are recorded in the form of extracts 
from some forty letters that Sibley wrote to his wife, Sarah Jane Steele, from August 21, 
to November 12, 1862. These extracts are in the Sibley Papers in the manuscripts 
collection of the Minnesota Historical Society. These letters indicate some of Sibley’s 
intimate details about the 1862 campaign a man would share with his wife.  
  Despite his intimate knowledge of the Indian culture, languages, and the Santee chiefs, 
including Little Crow, the use of the rhetoric of “savagery” seems to be prevalent in his 
correspondence and reports. On the second day of the expedition, August 21, Sibley and 
his troops marched from Shakopee to Belle Plaine. There he wrote his first letter of the 
campaign to his wife: “Things are bad enough no doubt in the upper country,” he said, 
“but I have no idea that the savages will withstand the attack of an organized force”.61 
The news of widespread slaughter and the extent of the Indian outbreak compelled him 
for fast action. This in turn reinforced his rhetoric of “killing the savages,” as he wrote “I 
hope soon to be reinforced by more reliable material, and be supplied with ammunition 
and rations, so that I can overtake and kill a thousand or more of the savages and drive 
the remainder across the Missouri or to the devil.”62 In different extracts, Sibley 
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described the Indians through this prism of dehumanization—“savages” and 
“murderers”—which in turn takes into effacing them and perform “the concomitant 
indigenization of the [white] settler,” as Johnston and Lawson put it.63 
  This jingoism of “Indian cruelty” and “white innocence” became powerful political 
modus operandi to justify the removal policy vis-à-vis the Sioux Indians, as highlighted 
earlier in President Lincoln speech that “The people of that State manifest much anxiety 
for the removal of the tribes beyond the limits of the State as a guaranty against future 
hostilities”.64 
  The rhetorical discourse of settler colonialism, skulking in a racially-coded logic, is 
prevalent in Generals’ reports. Major General Pope, the commander of the new Military 
Department of the Northwest, wrote to General-in-chief Henry Halleck that a quick 
“exterminating and ruining [of] all the Indians engaged” would bring him back to the 
locus of actions against the Confederacy [emphasis added].65 The concomitance of 
“savagery” and “extermination” defined much of the subsequent policy of U.S generals 
during the 1862 Minnesota War. On September 23, 1862, Sibley, after the battle with 
Little Crow and his men near the mouth of the Chippewa River, wrote to his wife: “A 
large force of savages attacked us this morning, and after a desperate fight of two hours, 
we whipped them handsomely, killed twenty five or thirty of their warriors, and wounded 
a large number, with a loss on our side of four men killed outright and thirty five or forty 
wounded”.66 Vengeful soldiers murdered many of the Santee and scalped several others 
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even though Sibley objected such practices. He wrote “The bodies of dead, even of a 
savage enemy, shall not be subjected to indignities by civilized Christian men.”67 Sibley’s 
conception of himself as “civilized Christian” influenced both his perception of the 
Native as “savage heathen” and the subsequent policy directed at the Santee. 
  In the same vein, it is not uncommon for soldiers in war to demonize their enemy. 
Union troops who rallied to march against the Sioux often used racist and condescending 
terms such as “bloodthirsty savages”, “Mr. Lo” and “Mr. Red”.68 A. P. Connolly made 
this comparison between the Southern soldiers and American Indians: “In the South we 
fought foeman worthy of our steel, soldiers who were manly enough to acknowledge 
defeat of their opponents. Not so the Redskins. Their tactics were of the skulking kind; 
their object scalps, and not for glory. They never acknowledged defeat, had no respect for 
a fallen foe, and gratified for their natural propensity for blood.”69 While the soldiers 
changed their view of the Southerners who used to be described as “traitors” and 
“cowards”, but never would the image of the Sioux change in the soldiers’ perception.  
  The same demeaning and inferior image of the Sioux was replicated among soldiers 
and generals, including President Lincoln. “The desire for revenge, or actual 
extermination of the Santees, motivated many soldiers,” as Paul Beck wrote.70 Eli Pickett, 
10th Minnesota Infantry, wrote a letter to his wife, Philena Pickett, in which he stated “I 
know that my hatred for the Indian is great … so great I believe I could murder the most 
helpless of their women and children without a feeling of remorse.” This feeling of 
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enmity or the settler colonial mentality continues in Pickett’s writing: “This Indian war 
will not only rid Minnesota of the Indians, but will bring millions and millions of dollars 
to our state.”71 
  By the same token, A. P. Connolly reiterated this rhetoric of extermination when he 
argued that the upcoming campaign against the Sioux was “the final extinction of the 
Indians.”72 The rhetoric of effacing the Sioux during the expedition manifests itself as 
well in Duren Kelley’s letter to his wife Emma Kelley: “This is going to be a tremendous 
expedition. If I don’t do extinction somebody will be to blame… the Indians had better 
say their prayers for they are surely going to be snuffed out”.73 Many Sioux people were 
not part of the war, but found themselves “guilty of being hostile” for the mere fact they 
were Sioux.74 The Dakota raids on white settlers reinforced indeed the anti-Indian 
sentiment and rationalized the soldiers’ belief that those Santees represented a threat to 
the frontier communities of white settlers and had to be removed. Yet, not only those 
Dakotas who had surrendered and never participated in the war were removed from 
Minnesota, but also 2,000 Winnebagos, completely innocent of any role in the uprising, 
“were beginning to be removed from Minnesota, banished to the new reservation of Crow 
Creek 150 miles up the Missouri River from Fort Randall.”75 
  Sibley’s casualties were light comparing to the Indians, but his concern for the 
captives urged him to complain to Governor Ramsey. “If only I had 500 cavalry,” he 
wrote, “I could have killed the greater part of the Indians, and brought the campaign to a 
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successful close.”76 The campaign was already over with the surrender of the Santees and 
Little Crow’s departure to Canada in search of new allies to continue the war. Sibley’s 
final march on September 25th, rescued the 296 captives and “established a bivouac at the 
site, which he christened Camp Release, and proceeded to round up in the next two 
weeks some 2,000 surrendering Sioux.”77 The accused did not obtain any legal assistance 
or representation and were hardly given a chance to defend themselves. Their major 
allegation was their presence at the scene of the crime and above all, for being Native 
Americans. Among the 392 charged, 307 were found guilty of heinous crime against 
white settlers. President Lincoln received a telegraph from General Pope on November 
7th and after a careful perusal of the convictions, reduced the number of mass hanging to 
thirty-nine, including chaska who had saved a white woman—Sarah Wakefield—and her 
children during the captivity.  
  In his letters to his wife and reports, Sibley made it clear that he expected the 303 
condemned prisoners to die. He was frustrated, like most other Minnesotans, at Lincoln’s 
drastic reduction of the “death list” of Sioux from 303 to 39. A last-minute pardon 
reached another Indian man before thirty-eight Sioux went to the gallows in Mankato on 
December 26, 1862, in “America’s greatest mass execution.”78 Besides those sentenced 
to death, “300 were directed toward either the hangman’s rope or prison bars, another 
1,658 charged with no other crime than being on the war’s losing side, remained under 
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Sibley’s jurisdiction at Camp Release.”79 Indeed, like major settler colonial conflicts, the 
aftermath of the 1862 Minnesota War worsened much of the intolerable living conditions 
of the Santees and many other Native Americans, as Congress passed legislation in 
February and March, 1863, “voiding all the treaties with Santee tribes, erasing their 
reservations, and ending their annuities… Over one million acres of Indian land were 
offered up for sale and settlements to white emigrants.”80 In the spring of 1863, in the 
absence of any serious threat, Minnesotan and local press expressed dissatisfaction at the 
punishment of Santee tribes. The St. Paul Press warned that “The war is not over! What 
the people of Minnesota demand is…that the war shall now be offensive. In God’s name 
let the columns of vengeance move on … until the whole accursed race is crushed.”81   
  Thus, from beginning to end, the Sioux outbreak of 1862 was a tragic and brutal 
episode in the history of Indian-white relations in America. Its central feature is 
“territoriality”, as the colonial structures of alienation and dehumanization of the Santee 
were necessary for an attempt to banish and place Indian tribes on reservations and open 
their lands to white settlers. Despite the allegorical images and themes of “savagery vs. 
civilization”, the primary motive for elimination is not race or grade of civilization, but 
access to territory.82 Like similar conflicts of settler colonialism, its underlying causes 
were complex and deeply rooted in the past. Yet, would it have occurred if the national 
situation had been different? Perhaps missionary Stephen R. Riggs, who had spent 
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several decades with the Sioux, was right when he declared: “If there had been no 
Southern war, there would have been no Dakota uprising and no Minnesota massacres!”83  
   Unquestionably, the “Southern war” played a major role in fuelling the uprising, but 
the flock of thousands of settlers to Minnesota, the destruction of the Dakota crop, the 
disappearance of bison, starvation, the delay of annuities payment for selling their land, 
and repeatedly violated treaties had indeed a profound impact in the U.S.-Dakota war of 
1862. The violence of settler colonialism did not end there as the vast majority of Dakota 
place-names, historic and sacred sites were re-named with a white male or Euro-
American landmark.84 In hindsight, much of the “ill-conceived” policies of American 
settler colonialism in Minnesota are reiterated elsewhere. Although different in time and 
space, Zionism and later the State of Israel internalized a propensity for creating a new 
Jewish State in Palestine to the detriment of its indigenes.   
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Chapter Three: On Politics of Zionism and Settler Colonialism 
I found my way home, passing bodies everywhere, in the middle of the streets and along the 
sidewalks, including bodies of acquaintances. When I reached the beginning of our street, my 
knees shaking with fear, I saw my family leaving our home with some light belongings.85   
Settler colonialism has been an unescapable dominant theme throughout the history of 
the Holy Land. Various tribes and nations occupied the land—from the Canaanites, 
Amorites, Jebusites and Jews to the Babylonians, Romans, Persians, and Arabs.86 The 
Israeli-Palestinian equation is not unique in this sense as a new phase of settler 
colonialism has reemerged with the rise of Zionism in the late nineteenth century. As a 
modern political movement, Zionism has not only brought a new contest over the land, 
but also its major leading figures have reproduced certain colonial dynamics of world-
wide politics of settler colonialism: land confiscation, cultural effacement, legal 
appropriation and a discursive strategy of alienation to delegitimize the grievances of the 
Palestinian Arabs. This cadastral structure of de-arabizing (judaising) the land has 
replicated certain practices of nineteenth century American policy vis-à-vis Indian tribes, 
including the Dakota people.  
This chapter uses the concept of settler colonialism as a basis to articulate a principled 
critique of Israel's settler colonial reality. First, it examines how has the philosophy of a 
‘homeless’ and ‘nationless’ political movement—Zionism— validated the establishment 
of a Jewish State in Palestine. Second, it discusses the historiographical debate on the 
concept of Terra Nullius or “a land without people” and how, to a certain extent, it has 
conceptually validated Israeli colonial practices. Third, it historicizes the 1948 War as it 
has laid the ground for seven inconclusive wars and ending, for the most part, in Israeli 
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territorial acquisitions and in the dismembering of what is left of Palestine into scattered 
West Bank communities, living under the shadow of Israeli military occupation.87 In this 
vein, it is axiomatic to examine the historiographical debate of the 1948 war and how the 
way settler colonial winners write and conceptualize history. Fourth, as a glaring example 
of the persistent violence of settler colonial encounter between settlers, state and 
indigenes, we examine the massacre of Lydda (Lod, al-Lud) and Ramle in July 1948 
within the general framework of settler colonialism. And, finally, the last two parts look 
at two more key aspects of Israel’s settler colonial advance and land-allocation episodes 
through the dynamics of cultural effacement or Judaisation of the land and legal 
confiscation.  
 
I. The Philosophy of Zionism and its Political Goals: 
Zionism is a term architected by the Viennese writer Nathan Birnbaum in 1890 to 
designate the corporate will of the Jewish people to re-establish a Jewish national 
renaissance, through settlements in Palestine, as conceived of as their nation’s homeland. 
In the words of Birnbaum, Palestine “alone held out hope of peace for the Jew.”88 
Zionism emerged as a reaction to twin challenges to the Jewish identity—assimilation 
and persecution in Europe. Its earliest stirrings as a political movement occurred in 
Russia in the 1880s after the assassination of Tsar Alexander II and the notorious “May 
Laws.”89 But its official appearance began in earnest in 1897 when the Hungarian Jewish 
leader Theodor Herzl convened the first Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland. In his 
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diaries, Herzl wrote: “If I had to sum up the Basel Congress in one word—which I shall 
not do openly—it would be this: At Basel I founded the Jewish State. If I were to say this 
today, I would be greeted by universal laughter. In five years, perhaps, and certainly in 
50, everyone will see it.”90 His prophecy of a “Jewish State” began to take shape through 
massive immigration, land acquisition and territorial control in Palestine. 
To build a Jewish State meant to fashion a contemporary vessel for the spirit that had 
inhabited its people from their origins. Religious Jews always represented a vigorous and 
vocal minority of Zionism—‘right’ political Zionists whose nationalism encompasses 
Greater Israel.91 To pursue its political goals, an uneasy alliance between classical liberals 
(such as Theodor Herzl and Chaim Weitzmann) and socialists (such as David Ben-Gurion 
who founded Labor Zionism and members of the religious orthodoxy), composed an 
uneasy alliance.”92 The alliance helped leading Zionist figures look backward for sacred 
symbols to achieve goals traditionally associated with Jewish hopes and Jewish national 
identity, although many Jews strongly opposed the project of Zionism.93 Their ultimate 
goal was to “bring about the return to Zion” and morph the “Chosen people” into a 
“normal people,” and from the ills of the diaspora into their own Jewish State.94  
The sense of a place, as an experienced phenomenon, plays an integral role in the 
Jewish experience as it incorporates the “perceptions of objects and activities that are 
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used as sources of personal and collective identities.”95 Zionist national tradition 
encapsulates a politicization of space of belonging, where heterogeneous Sephardic 
(Oriental), and Ashkenazi (European) Jews live under one nation.96 In order to transcend 
the persecution of the Jewish minority in Europe, the Zionist narrative created an 
ontological necessity to associate with a significant place—Eretz Israel. In contrast to the 
nineteenth century Euro-American colonial rhetoric of “civilizing” the heathens, the 
Zionist movement appealed to the persecuted Jewish minority in Europe to return to their 
ancient land. The messianic Zionism gravitates toward an inward mission civilizatrice—
bringing social change and development to thousands of Jews around the world. It called 
for a persecuted religious minority across the world to consolidate themselves and create 
a new society in Palestine. This new inward mission resonated the ideology of the 
Puritans, who spearheaded settler colonialism in the United States, upon which a new 
Jerusalem could be inscribed, but, whereas, “Zionism was based in concepts of return, 
restoration and re-inscription.”97  
The concepts of “return, restoration and re-inscription” define the major roles of 
leading Zionists such as Herzl, Weizmann and Ben Gurion. Herzl founded Zionism, 
Chaim Weizmann secured the Balfour Declaration and David Ben-Gurion established the 
State of Israel within 77 percent of Palestine.98 But, despite the theoretical cleavage 
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between ‘Left wing’ vs. ‘Right wing’ Zionism, both wings not only reject the notion that 
Israel is a colonial-settler state, but also they deny the expulsion of thousands of 
Palestinians during the 1947-1948 war, as discussed later in this chapter.  Moreover, 
major writings of early Zionists, like Zangwill’s, played a credential role in ‘emptying’ 
the land conceptually from its Arab inhabitants. The ‘invisibility’ of the Palestinians is a 
critical component of a repertoire of mechanisms of settler colonial rule and a prominent 
part of a moral grammar to underwrite and reproduce power. In hindsight, leading figures 
of Zionism and Israel conceptualized Palestine as a wasteland and Palestinians as 
“landless.” 
    II. The Invisibility of the Palestinians: 
There has been a historiographical debate as to whether the phrase “a land without a 
people, for a people without land,” was a fragment of the early Zionist literary and 
intellectual history. Several leading Palestinian intellectuals such as Edward Said, Rashid 
Khalidi and Israeli historians such Avi Shlaim and Benny Morris have identified the 
famous—or infamous—phrase as originating with Israel Zangwill. Although the phrase is 
not Zangwill’s, a slightly altered statement appears in his article “The Return to 
Palestine” in the New-Liberal Review (1901), in which he states:  
Palestine is a country without a people; the Jews are a people without 
a country. The regeneration of the soil would bring the regeneration of the 
people. It is marvelous that the country should have remained 
comparatively empty for eighteen hundred years; but it cannot remain 
unexploited much longer… neither the Jew nor Palestine can wait 
longer.99  
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More versions of the phrase have become ubiquitous ever since. Golda Meir’s statement 
in her interview with Frank Giles in 1969 remains the most flagrant. “There was no such 
thing as Palestinians,” she said. “It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in 
Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian people… they did not exist.”100 Although a 
few early Zionists (including Herzl) believed that the land was ‘virtually empty,’ Meir’s 
phrase claims there were literally no inhabitants there (“without a people”); it was not 
even underpopulated.    
Other Zionists like Martin Buber, who worked tirelessly for Jewish-Arab conciliation 
in Palestine, considered Palestine “underpopulated” and existing on the spectrum of 
scattered Bedouins and not as a united group of people wedded to a particular 
community, and whose members define themselves as Palestinians. In September 1921, 
he wrote: “I know how hard it is to negotiate with people who are not yet constituted 
politically as nations and who have no legitimate representatives.”101 In other words, 
Buber perceived Zangwill’s phraseology as not an exclusion of the Palestinian 
demography but rather its existence as a political entity. Zangwill articulated the relevant 
political context of advocating a Jewish State in Palestine given the waves of anti-
Semitism in Europe. He called for Jewish philanthropic efforts to “stimulate the most 
maligned of races to break the desolate monotony of this brutal modern world.”102 
Zangwill’s statement is not unprecedented since similar concepts of “emptiness” featured 
throughout the nineteenth century’s writings of Christian Zionists such as Lord 
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Shaftesbury and John Lawson Stoddard.103 Had their claims been true, there would have 
been no conflict and the Jews could have peacefully created their own Jewish State. But, 
the Arab community who had lived there for centuries refused to share their land and 
resisted the Jewish settlers from Europe.  
Despite the locals’ recalcitrance, some of the Zionist writings represented Palestinians 
as tribal Bedouins and too inept to cultivate the land. Menachem Ussishkin, the Chairman 
of the Jewish National fund and a leading Zionist stated in 1930, “If there are other 
inhabitants there, they must be transferred to some other places. We must take over the 
land. We have a greater and nobler ideal than preserving several hundred thousands of 
Arab fellahin.”104 Similarly, the Manichean allegory of ‘progress’ vs. ‘backwardness’ 
was imbued in Weizmann’s statement, in which he described the Palestinians and 
Palestine as “a vast stretch of territory bordering on the Mediterranean…sparsely 
populated by a semi-backward people with a low standard of living.”105 This racially-
coded rhetoric delegitimized Palestinians’ genuine ties to the land and thus facilitated the 
indigeneity of the Jewish settlers. In a speech delivered at a meeting of the French Zionist 
Federation, Paris, 28 March 1914, Weizmann reproduced much of Zangwill’s slogan of 
the Terra Nullius: “there is a country which happens to be called Palestine, a country 
without a people, and, on the other hand, there exists the Jewish people, and it has no 
country. What else is necessary, then, than to fit the gem into the ring, to unite this people 
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with this country?”106 Zangwill, Weizmann, Herzl and Meir’s statements on Palestine 
rendered the local Arab populace conceptually invisible, but if they exist they are ‘semi-
backward’ and ‘unfit’ to fertilize the land. “If His Majesty the Sultan were to give us 
Palestine,” Herzl wrote, “we should there form the portion of a rampart of Europe against 
Asia, an outpost of civilization as opposed to barbarism.”107 If by any other mean the 
Arabs refuse to welcome the civilizing “corrigible mission” of the Jewish immigrants to 
Palestine, then it would be evidence of their inferiority.108  
That being said, the old adage of colonialism centers first on the negation of the 
other’s existence—the emptiness of the land, but if the ‘other’ does exist then 
‘nomadism’, spacelessness, and statelessness remains covert to expropriate the land and 
legitimize the concomitant indigenization of the new Jewish  settlers in Palestine. The 
historical argument of race and terra nullius are crucial parts of the Israeli colonial system 
that structures and nuances the way Israeli soldiers imagine and treat Palestinian people. 
This imagination still reverberates today. In summer 2004, as Israeli soldiers were 
uprooting acres of olive orchards to build a 24-foot high concrete wall extending well 
into Palestinian territory, “protesters asked soldiers guarding the bulldozers why they 
were destroying cultivated Palestinian fields. The heavily armed soldiers pointed their 
rifles at the protestors and yelled, ‘They are foreigners here. This all belongs to us.’”109 
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     III. “The Land Belongs to…”: The Kettle of Settler Colonialism 
Territorial sovereignty has been and continues to be the crux of the Israeli occupation 
of Palestine. For Palestinians, the land is their home; for Zionist-Jews, it is a long-lost 
land from which they were expelled thousands of years ago; today, it is the same land 
from which Palestinians are in exile.110 Like settler colonial projects, space has been a 
zero-sum contest in defining the broader political enterprise of which the State of Israel 
was and remains the expression. In its unstated policy of territorial aggrandizement, land 
of an entire village or town was swiftly seized and occupied and its inhabitants were 
subsequently forced to leave.111 This was possible during the wars of 1948 and 1967 and 
settlements today continue to increase in the West Bank. However, land seizure for 
Jewish settlements and absorption of immigrants began in 1897 after the Basel meeting.  
The practical aspect of Zionism, as espoused by Hovevei (Lovers of) Zion, involved 
small-scale settlements in Palestine below the political radar of both Russia and the 
Ottoman Empire. In fact, the impact of the Ottoman land reform laws of 1858 and 1867 
laid the ground for shifting the land tenure system in Palestine and helped Jewish settlers 
penetrate into the land. These laws were the outcome of a series of Ottoman Tanzimât—
reforms. The main purpose of the Ottoman Land Code of 1858 was to define 
landholdings and categories precisely, abolish the system of tax farming, and consolidate 
and retrieve the state’s rights to its miri land (state land requiring official permission for 
transfer).112  
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While the 1858 Land Code was enacted to establish clear proof of title to ownership 
and hold the owners liable for taxes, the Ottoman Land Code of 1867 granted foreigners 
citizenship and the right to own land as long as they pay taxes to the Ottoman 
government.113 Foreign Jews, legally resident in Palestine would, as a matter of fact, be 
permitted to buy land. Despite the Ottoman restrictions on land sale to foreigners, a small 
number of urban merchants and notables, including foreign Jews, were able to buy land 
in Palestine and Syria in accordance with the 1867 Land Code.114 Many peasants 
(fellahin), however, were unable to pay large fees to landholders to establish titles, let 
alone pay taxes on the land. Very few Palestinian notables—local Christians [Sursuq 
family, Greek Orthodox, purchased a total of 230.000 dunams (57,000 acres) from the 
Ottomans], Christian merchants from Beirut, acquired extensive areas of land while 
allowing the fellahin to cultivate their lands as they used to.115  
The dynamics of land ownership vacillates between two conceptions of dialectical 
reality—de jure and de facto. The latter means that the property rights are specified by 
first person (an individual claims the land) or second person (a group assigns rights or 
norms emerge) while de jure rights are specified by a government with recognized 
authority. In practice, the fellahin had cultivated the land for several decades and 
considered themselves in congruence to land ownership as illustrated in their motto: 
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“Ardi hiya hawiyati!” meaning “My land is my identity!”116 All at once, they lost 
‘property rights’ as absentee landlords sold their land to Jewish settlers.117 The net result 
was the increase of the Jewish community in Palestine. By 1897, there were about fifty 
thousand Jews in Palestine and eighteen new settlements.118 The creation of the World 
Zionist Organization’s own bank in 1899 and the Jewish National Fund in 1901 helped 
the development of Jewish settlements. The possibilities of buying land grew wider when 
Baron Maurice de Hirsch founded the Jewish Colonization Association in 1891 (JCA—
unconnected with the Zionist Movement). In 1901, the JCA acquired 31,500 dunams of 
land near Tiberias from the Sursuq family of Beirut.119 
The commitment to the land and the creation of a socialist agricultural basis for a new 
Jewish society began with second Aliyah (1903 onward, following renewed pogroms in 
Russia). The Jews had acquired then 400,000 dunams of land (out of a total area of about 
27 million dunams), of which slightly more than half was under cultivation.120 Purchases 
were facilitated both by the fact that many large landholders in northern Palestine resided 
in Beirut and by the willingness of the Ottoman officials there to ignore regulations. 
Similar practices occurred in and around Jerusalem from 1901 onward as the appointed 
Ottoman governors permitted Jews to buy land in return for financial favors. The Anglo-
Palestine Company, the first Zionist organization established in Palestine, found that 
despite Ottoman laws, local Ottoman authorities would permit land sales in return for 
loans from the company to the governor.  
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Although land tenure reforms began under Ottoman rule, the British Mandate in 
Palestine (1917-1948) facilitated the process for Jews to take possession of the fertile 
geography—North of Palestine.121 In 1920, Jews owned 100,000 acres of land. By 1929, 
they increased their land base by an additional 128,000 acres. This turned the Jewish 
community in Palestine into a vibrant community within a State.122 This State was 
structured and nuanced between 1878 and 1936 during which Zionists acquired 52.6% of 
their entire land purchases from large absentee landlords.123 The rising tide of European 
Jewish immigration, land purchases and settlement generated increasing animosity in 
Palestine. Peasants, journalists and political figures feared that these practices would lead 
eventually to the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine.  
Palestinian resistance to British control and Zionist settlement climaxed with the Arab 
revolt of 1936–1939, which Britain repressed with the help of Zionist militias and the 
complicity of neighboring Arab regimes. After suppressing the Arab revolt, the British 
reconsidered their governing policies vis-à-vis Palestine through the 1939 White Paper.124 
The Zionists interpreted the White Paper’s form as an egregious act of betrayal the 
Balfour Declaration, particularly in light of the desperate situation of the Jews in Europe. 
This policy paper ended the British-Zionist alliance and defeated the Arab revolt.  
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By 1939 the JNF had acquired 64,000 dunams in the Jordan and Baysan valleys and 
between 1939 and 1946 they purchased another 11,000 dunams.125 By 1947 a total of 12 
Jewish settlements were established on JNF lands in the Baysan valley. By 1948, Jews 
possessed 20% of Palestine.126 After the 1948 war, land acquisition became no longer an 
assertive land-purchasing schemes, but a matter of military occupation. Upon the 
evacuation of thousands of Palestinians, the State of Israel soon began establishing Israeli 
civilian settlements on expropriated Palestinian lands.127 The 1967 war reinforced the 
1948 pattern where it displaced thousands of Palestinians and confiscated their properties 
“on grounds of ‘security’ and frequently thereafter turned into settlements or housing 
centres.”128 But beyond just settling its own population on occupied lands, the State of 
Israel, as discussed later in this chapter, initiated legal steps to expropriate these 
settlements through “Absentees’ property” laws, and other ordinances.129    
Territorial acquisition from absentee landlords became viable only with the collapse of 
the Ottoman Empire and its post-World War I sponsorship by Britain, the paramount 
imperial power of the day.130 As Zionists’ growing control of the land had consolidated, 
Arabs’ rudimentary opposition to Jewish settlements in Palestine and their vague 
awareness became real with the Balfour Declaration in 1917.131 In a book published in 
Paris in 1905 (Le Reveil de la Nation Arabe), Naguib Azoury, a Maronite Catholic, 
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predicted an alarming clash between the Arabs and Jews over the land. While most 
Palestinian Muslims remained loyal to the Ottoman authority, Palestinian Christians led 
the public opposition to land purchases, Zionist immigration and Jewish exclusiveness. 
The background to some of this violence was the 1936–1939 Arab revolt (the Great 
Revolt), as a response to “the general uncertainty as to the ultimate intentions of the 
Mandatory Power.”132  
These events helped the Palestine Royal Commission in 1937 to craft a report on the 
tumultuous situation in Palestine, outlining the unviability and undesirability of the two 
antagonistic communities to live side by side. Fueling enmity, the Commission decided to 
put “forward the principle of Partition and not to give it any concrete shape.”133 The Arab 
Revolt in the 1930s created a new reality in the Zionist imagination. The Palestinian 
Arab, in particular, transformed “from a natural part of the landscape into a coherent, 
hostile political force, an enemy that would have to be vanquished in the struggle to 
establish a Jewish state.”134 Both nationalisms had grown and gripped each other in 
reciprocal antagonism, an apparently endless dance of mutual menace and injury. The 
1948 war remains more than a simple reflection of this animosity, but also the beginning 
of the second phase of Israeli settler colonialism—military occupation. In other words, it 
embodies an ideological significance and sets the lexicon to describe subsequent major 
events, actions, peoples, and places that uphold or contest power over the land.                          
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    IV. The Conquest of Latrun, Lydda & Ramle (May-July 1948): 
    After the United Nations General Assembly Partition Resolution of November 29th, 
1947, the three towns of Latrun, Lydda and Ramle were allocated in the proposed Arab-
Palestinian State. The conquest of Latrun, Lydda and Ramle is a web of narratives 
composed of national and political myths that structured and nuanced images of the 1948 
Arab-Israeli war. These images imbued a plethora of national figures and heroes to shape 
a certain historical memory. Yet, the loss of control over collective memory and its link 
with historical documentation has been challenged with the rise of the “new historians.” 
The battles fought in Latrun (Operation Bin-Nun A) on May 25, 1948, Lydda and Ramle 
(some five kilometers to the south), under “Operation Dani” (Mivtza‘ Dani), on 10-14th 
of July 1948, not only encapsulate one of the most important and tragic episodes of the 
1948 war, but also the growing disconnect between the collective memory and the new 
historical research. The goal behind the capture of Lydda, Ramle and Latrun was to 
discharge the semi-besieged Jerusalem by securing the whole length of the Tel Aviv-
Jerusalem highway.135 
    Israeli military forces tempted to secure a territorial link between the coastal plain and 
Jewish Jerusalem. Prime Minister David Ben Gurion ordered Yigael Yadin, the 
operations officer and deputy chief of staff, to concentrate the Seventh Brigade—among 
them Shlomo Shamir, head of the brigade, and Hayyim Laskov, commander of the 
armored battalion—in order to breach a road to Jerusalem.136 The Latrun area was 
occupied in May 1948 and the new artery carried traffic to Jerusalem until 1967. In the 
wake of Operation Bin-Nun A, newspapers carried only sparse reports about the 
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confrontation and gave few details. Briefing foreign journalists, the IDF spokesman 
described Latrun’s battle as “satisfactory.”137 Similarly, Israeli officials claimed that 
Arabs had lost 250 casualties while Jewish  losses, aside from very few dead and injured, 
the final losses of Operation of Bin-Nun A “have not yet been determined.”138 On the 
other hand, Ben-Gurion stressed the positive aspect of the battle and praised the 
performance of the Seventh Brigade and claimed a “military victory.”139   
       Irrespective of the accuracy of the number, Lieutenant Colonel Yisrael Ber, Yadin’s 
subordinate in the planning Branch, Department of Operations, during the 1948 war, 
commented on the battle for Latrun as a “strategic advance guard”, tying Arab forces 
down and preventing them from attacking Jewish  population centers in the coastal 
plain.140 Ber describes the events at Latrun as a “heroic epic” and important moment in 
the birth of the Jewish national State. This was not the case for another protagonist of the 
war, as described by Yigal Mosinsoln’s book, In the Wilderness of the Negev (Be-arvot 
ha-Negev): “I was in Latrun! Look, I don’t know if that name says very much to you. 
But, man that was hell on earth, Latrun! […] And I’ll never forget one of the new 
immigrants who was lying there on the ground, he was in the throes of death.”141 The 
trauma of resettlement, uprooting and replanting, is always filled with bitterness and pain. 
The battle for Latrun was a catharsis of liberation and the genesis of a new trauma for the 
natives as well as the new Jewish immigrants. The latter who survived a cruel war in 
Europe had to fight another settler colonial war in Palestine; some of them lost their lives, 
others survived, but supported the establishment of an ethnic community of their own. 
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Latrun’s circumstances were circumvented so as long as Ben-Gurion served both as 
prime minister and defense minister, criticism was restricted to the realms of hearsay and 
fiction.142  
     Similarly, the primary goal of Operation Dani—the major offensive launched by the 
IDF at the order of Ben-Gurion during the so-called “Ten Days” of fighting (8-18 July 
1948), between the First Truce (11 June-8 July) and the Second Truce (8 July 1948-early 
1949), was to occupy Lydda and its neighbor Ramle and outmaneuver the Arab Legion 
positions at Latrun in order to penetrate central Palestine and capture Ramallah and 
Nablus. Both towns held a strategic importance in intersecting the country’s main north-
south and west-east road and rail lines.143 The Israeli forces assembled under the overall 
command of Yigal Allon, the Palmach144 commander—two Palmach brigades (Yiftach 
and Harel, the latter under the command of Yitzhak Rabin), the Eighth Armored Brigade, 
the second Battalion Kiryati Brigade, the Third Battalion Alexandroni Kiryati and several 
units of the Kiryati Garrison Troops, making a total of 8,000 Israeli soldiers. On the other 
hand, the Arab Legion (defending Lydda and Ramle) was a minuscule 125 men—the 
Fifth Infantry Company of the Transjordanian Arab Legion.145   
      Fierce combat broke out on all fronts around Lydda and Ramle in the night of 9-10 
July resulting in the killing of 250 civilians in an “orgy of indiscriminate killing.”146 The 
8th Brigade of Israel Defense forces took the northern parts of the Lydda valley, including 
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the villages of Deir Tarif and Haditha, and the international airport near Tel Aviv. The 
elite of the Yiftach Brigade took the southern parts: the villages of Inaba, Gimzu, Daniyal 
and Dahiriya. Within twenty-four hours, all villages in Lydda were occupied.147 On July 
11th, along with the expulsion of the inhabitants of Lydda and Ramle, the IDF expelled 
the populations of some twenty-five villages conquered during Operation Dani, making a 
total of some 80,000 expellees—the largest single instance of deliberate mass expulsion 
during the 1948 war.148 From the start, the military operations against the two towns were 
designed to induce civilian panic and flight. The Israeli air force showered Ramle and 
Lydda with leaflets stating: “You have no chance of receiving help. We intend to conquer 
the towns. We have no intention of harming persons or property. [But] whoever attempts 
to oppose us—will die. He who prefers to live must surrender.”149 Bombings from the air 
and shelling of artillery of Lydda and Ramle, in the words of Yiftah Brigade’s 
intelligence officer “caused flight and panic among the civilians [and] a readiness to 
surrender.”150 Many Lydda inhabitants feared that a massacre would take place by Third 
Battalion troops and so, many rushed to the streets, only to be pushed back by Israeli fire.  
Yeruham Cohen, an intelligence officer at Operation Dani HQ, later described the 
bedlam: “The inhabitants of the town became panic-stricken. They feared that … the IDF 
troops would take revenge on them. It was a horrible, earsplitting scene. Women wailed 
at the tops of their voices and old men said prayers, as if they saw their own deaths before 
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their eyes…”151 The panic-stricken disorder forced thousands of Lydda’s inhabitants to 
flee.  
    On the Palestinian side, Spiro Munnayar was one of those few allowed to stay in his 
hometown while 49,000 of Lydda’s 50,000 inhabitants were forcefully expelled.152 
Although he was not in a political or military position, Munnayar was actively involved 
as a volunteer paramedic, organizing the telephone network between sectors of Lydda’s 
front lines. On duty, he saw wounded, dead bodies and a city in carnage. Children, 
women and elderly people were teemed, marching hands up to the grand mosque. 
“People were being rounded up and herded under guard into the mosque in an endless 
stream,” he narrates: 
    It was July and terribly hot; the air was stifling. The only water was in 
the fountain for performing ablutions, but we could not reach it. People 
started passing water vessels from hand to hand. There was a tremendous 
crush, bodies squeezed against each other with no room to sit; movement 
was almost impossible. Many fainted from heat, thirst, and fear. To top it 
all, soldiers were firing over our heads to intimidate us and keep us 
quiet.153 
Israeli military forces (the erstwhile Haganah and Palmach) engaged in a wide variety of 
repressive tactics and forms of collective punishment aimed at putting down the 
“uprising” of Lydda. The collective nature of the Israeli military incursions imposed by 
the settler colonial strategy is characterized by the sensational atrocities typically 
associated with the dismantlement of Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish State. 
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     On July 12th, 300-400 Israeli troops were dispersed in the midst of tens of thousands 
of furious townspeople, who felt threatened and vulnerable. Third Battalion commander 
Moshe Kalman ordered his troops to suppress the local “uprising” with utmost severity. 
The troops were ordered to shoot at “any clear target” or, alternatively, at anyone “seen 
on the streets.”154 The curfew shut local inhabitants up in their houses while Israeli 
soldiers lobbed grenades into houses from which they suspected snipers to be operating. 
In such mayhem, some of them attempted to escape while many unarmed detainees in 
town, mosques, and church compounds were shot and killed.155 The IDF, for that matter, 
conducted a massacre of defenseless prisoners of war (POWs) in the al-‘Umari Mosque 
on July 12, 1948, after Lydda had surrendered.156 Israeli troops looted vacant properties 
and conquered areas. Yiftach Brigade Commander Mula Cohen summarized the scene: 
“There is no doubt that the Lydda-Ramle affair and the flight of the inhabitants, the 
uprising [in Lydda] and the expulsion [geirush] that followed cut deep grooves in all who 
underwent [the experiences].”157 
      On July 13th, a massive exodus from Ramle and Lydda took place as inhabitants by 
and large were trucked and bussed out by Kiryati Brigade units to nearby villages like Al-
Qubab, from where they made their walking journey to Arab Legion lines. “The streets 
were filled with people,” said Munnayer, “setting out for indeterminate destinations. The 
important thing was to get out of the city.”158 Fierce fighting continued as Israeli forces 
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proceeded with their policy of expelling the entire local population, “entering the houses 
and dragging out the inhabitants, ordering them out of the city and on to Ramallah and al-
Bireh. The flood of displaced persons clogged the roads, a seemingly endless stream 
flowing east, with enemy soldiers firing over their heads every now and then.”159 At 
sunset, firing of automatic weapons continued to be heard until nightfall, “when silence 
descended on the city. We no longer could hear shooting nor the crying of children nor 
the lamentations of women. It was as though the city itself had died.”160 
 
Lydda and other cities were emptied as inhabitants were forced to flee.161 
On July 14th, having emptied both Ramle and Lydda of its inhabitants, Israeli soldiers 
(the erstwhile Haganah and Palmach) plundered Lydda’s shops and left their doors wide 
open.162 
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     Relying exclusively on the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) documents, Elhanan Oren and 
Benny Morris argued that the occupation and the expulsion of the Arab inhabitants in 
Operation Dani, especially from Lydda, was “pre-planned and deliberate,” owing to 
“strategic necessity and [as] a goal in itself.”163 From the beginning, there was a 
substantial need to conquer Lydda since the latter was an obstacle blocking the road to a 
Jewish State. If the young State of Israel “was to exist,” explains Ari Shavit, “Lydda 
could not exist.”164 In doing so, settlers conducted, in the words of Benny Morris, “the 
largest operation of its kind in the first Israeli-Arab war.”165 Indeed, the July 1948 war 
encapsulates a microcosm of the wider features of settler colonialism—territorial 
expansion and fierce violence—during the conquest of Latrun, Lydda and Ramle—the 
very epicenter of the Arab-Israeli war. This war helped create an entirely new society in 
place of an existing one. To appropriate settler advance and land-allocation episodes, it is 
axiomatic that the history of the Lydda massacre is written and conceptualized by the 
settler colonial winner. The history of the 1948 war is a case in point. 
     V. Historiography of the 1948 War:  
The 1948 war remains a defining moment in the history of the Middle East in that it 
has not only transformed the political landscape of Zionists and the Palestinian Arabs, but 
it has also impacted profoundly the entire region with the emergence of a new settler 
society.166 The war resulted in the birth of the State of Israel and the disintegration of 
Arab Palestine. A dialectic of legitimacy and illegitimacy followed as historians played a 
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substantial role in appropriating the origins of the state as well as its formation. Both the 
Arab and the Israeli nationalist histories are guided more, in Avi Shlaim’s words, by a 
“‘quest for legitimacy’ than by an honest reckoning with the past.”167 Each embraced a 
narrative of blame-throwing—distilling the allegations and blaming the other for the 
Palestinians’ plight. The Arab narrative terms the 1948 war, Al-Nakba (disaster or 
catastrophe), where a calamity befell the Palestinian Arabs, while the Zionists present 
their actions as retaliatory, leading to national sovereignty—the War of Independence. 
For the former, the war made them stateless, a nation of refugees and deprived of their 
homeland. For the latter, after fifty years of strenuous efforts, the war brought them a 
powerful and sovereign state of their own, which became a haven for Jewish immigrants 
across the world.  
   The political fabric of the 1948 war was a mobilizing force in disillusioning the 
defeat of the Arab national armies and “reaffirming a sort of Zionist manifest destiny” 
with no deficits.168 However, after the passage of thirty years, a critical debate took over 
as the Israeli government released documents to public criticism. A group of Israeli 
scholars, also known as “new historians,” and several Palestinian scholars educated in the 
West reframed the historiographical debate and challenged some of the Israeli 
conventional attitude toward the 1948 war. These historians have questioned the charges 
of the Palestinian expulsion and the destruction of their villages.169  
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Each scholar has discredited some of the “foundational myths” embodied in the state 
narrative of Israel since 1948.170 Their arguments center on five main prongs: “1) the 
Zionist movement did not enthusiastically embrace the partition of Palestine; 2) the 
surrounding Arab states did not unite as one to destroy the nascent Jewish State; 3) the 
war did not pit a relatively defenseless and weak Jewish David against a relatively strong 
Arab Goliath; 4) Palestine’s Arabs did not take flight at the behest of Arab orders; 5) 
Israel was not earnestly seeking peace at the war’s end.”171  Point four is integral in the 
post-1948 war reality, where the fight for survival of the Palestinian refugees involves “a 
fight for the recognition of their historical experience.”172 The arguments of the “new 
historians” have received sympathy within the Arab scholarship and an enormous dispute 
within the Israeli nationalist historians. For example, Benny Morris’s re-examination of 
the nascence of the Palestinian refugee problem is a case in point. His uncovered 
materials deconstructed the picture he had drawn earlier, in that the Palestinian refugee 
problem was arguably not premeditated and rather a corollary of war.173  
On the one hand, Laila Parson explains that the “secret wartime alliance” between the 
Yishuv (the Jewish colons in Palestine) and the Druze “allowed” the latter “to remain by 
design” during the 1948 war, while there was “at least partially coherent policy to expel 
Muslims.”174 Rashid Khalidi went even further to argue that the Israeli victory in the war 
and the “fall of numerous Arab cities and towns…the capture of a number of strategic 
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roads, junctions, positions,” which in turn resulted in the “expulsion of the first wave of 
Arabs from Palestine.”175 The expulsion of the Palestinian Arabs seems a valid argument 
in Nafez Nazzal’s interpretation of the war as well. Nazzal wrote: “after an examination 
of the evidence presented…no other conclusion is possible than that the Arabs of 
Galilee—and indeed all the Palestinians made refugees by 1947-49 fighting—left their 
homes as victims of a conscious and willful Zionist Plan.”176 The new historians’ take in 
tandem with Palestinian scholars educated in the West may seem overly optimistic in 
bringing a quiet revolution in redefining the history of the 1948 war.              
On the other hand, Israeli nationalist writers such as Anita Shapira, Shlomo Ben-Ami, 
Hillel Halkin, Aharon Meged, Shabtai Teveth, and Efraim Karsh put the onus of the 
Palestinian expulsion entirely on the Arabs, who allegedly requested the Palestinians to 
clear way for the invading Arab armies. Karsh, for example, writes “huge numbers of 
Palestinians were also driven out of their homes by their own leaders and/or by Arab 
military forces, whether out of military considerations, or more actively to prevent them 
from becoming citizens of the nascent Jewish State.”177 The effects of the psychological 
warfare and the heat of the battle were manifold and led the Arab High Committee 
(AHC) to force “huge numbers” to leave. In a letter to the United Nations during the 
1948 war, the Israeli Foreign Minister, Moshe Sharett, wrote “the Arab mass flight from 
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Israel and Israel-occupied territory is the direct effect of Arab aggression from 
outside.”178  
Narratives, regardless the degree of their accuracy, remain an important product of 
either the hero or the villain’s experience. New historians have arguably defined the 1948 
war as the watershed of the Zionist settler colonial project of depopulation and 
repopulation of the land—the Lydda massacre is a case in point.179 The Palestinians’ 
forced removal was, in Khalidi’s words, “the desired outcome of a process which began 
early in this century tradition selected an Asian land for its colonial activities, established 
itself step-by-step with Great Power assistance, and fought to overcome the resistance of 
the indigenous population.”180 Fayez Sayegh, in a letter discussed at the United Nations, 
argued that the Zionists’ prerogatives gained through the U.N. recognition of Israel as a 
Jewish State “together with the growing imbalance of Zionist and Arab military potential 
in favor of the former—rendered the circumstances favorable for launching the long 
awaited Zionist campaign for the forcible and violent displacement of the Palestinian 
Arabs.”181  
 As it may seem, the tendency of this historiographical debate is centered on the 
external causes of the Palestinian plight. But, what prompted the expulsion may not 
deprive the refugees to return to their land, as Christopher Hitchens argues: “Whatever 
may have prompted their flight, they had a right to expect to return home after the end of 
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hostilities. Nobody has so far been so bold as to deny that right was stripped from 
them.”182 That being said, the1948 war remains the most contested ground, yet the 
“foundation and consolidation of the State of Israel and its (unilateral) legitimacy vis-à-
vis Palestinian destruction—the moment of indigenous dispossession and the founding 
violence of a settler society.”183 Despite the new historiographical debate of the 1980s, 
few political developments such as the breakdown of the Oslo peace process, the 
outbreak of two intifadas, and the rise of Likud-dominated government, have made the 
Israeli public more suspicious of the new interpretations of the past and more receptive to 
the old history.184 That being said, terminology is subject to historical process. As in the 
1948 war setting, the word choice or naming reverberates power and forms a prominent 
part of historical transitions, which in turn appropriates the ‘narrativization’ of history.  
VI. Cultural Effacement: Hebraisation of Palestine 
Discourse creates, naturalizes and appropriates certain colonial actions because it 
occurs in an institutional context of power like settler-colonial rule.185 In the wake of the 
1948 war, Israel settler colonial paradigm has deployed transformations in naming to 
reconstruct Palestinian lands and Arab identities into a Jewish State and widespread 
biblical imaginaries. For example, al-Bassa became Betzet, Saffuriyyah became Tzippori, 
and Baysan became Beit Shean.186 This action could be seen in the work of the Names 
Committee in the 1930s. With statehood, the new Israel Place-Names Committee 
replaced the Names Committee and was tasked to change place names to either biblical 
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or national/Zionist ones.187 David Ben Gurion, Israel First Prime Minister, assigned nine 
scholars on Eretz Israel from the Israel Exploration Society (IES)—cartographers, 
archeologists, geographers, historians—to “develop and advance the study of the Land, 
its history, and pre-history, accentuating the settlement aspect and the sociohistorical 
connection between the people of Israel and Eretz Israel.”188 Their main scheme was to 
“assign Hebrew names to all the places—mountainous, valleys, springs, roads, and so on, 
in the Negev region.”189 Some of the local villagers were de-Arabized and lost connection 
with their land, particularly, the Palestinian Bedouins who was “almost entirely expunged 
from Zionism’s official history.”190 The fact of renaming Arab places embody an 
ideological significance and moral attributes of Jewish  cultural systems that structure and 
nuance the way the new settlers imagine and understand the new settler society.    
In the meantime, the rise of Zionism promulgated and cultivated the Jewish national 
identity through a pioneering settler-culture—songs, ceremonies, national holidays. The 
cultural fabric of an ancient Jewish homeland—Eretz Israel—absorbed masses of 
immigrants.191 This political orientation developed “a rigid form of territorial 
ethnonationalism … in order to indigenize immigrant Jews quickly and to conceal the 
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existence of a Palestinian people on the same land.”192 Zionist concerted efforts on 
appropriating the new settlements were part of transforming landscape, identities and 
forms of power. For instance, the Arab village of Yibna (10 miles southwest of Ramle) 
was occupied and depopulated during the 1948 war and repopulated with new Jewish 
settlers on April 1949. The new residents began using biblical name “Gan Yavne” or 
“Yavne village”—“the town where rabbinical scholarship was carried on after the 
destruction of the Second Temple by the Romans.”193 Renaming a place functions as a 
public claim and repeating it normalizes it. The Arab village of Yazur (located 3.7 miles 
east of Jaffa) is another instance of identity effacement. Yazur was captured in May 1948 
and repopulated by Jewish settlers in October and given the name of “Mishmar ha-
Shiv‘ah, in memory of the seven soldiers, who were killed there.194 These acts of 
linguistic appropriation and replacement entail, in Stephen Greenblatt’s words, “the 
cancelation of the native name—the erasure of the alien, perhaps demonic, identity—and 
hence a kind of making new; it is at once an exorcism, an appropriation, and a gift.”195 
Rendering the Palestinian space extinct validates the “divine land grant”.196  
After the 1948 war, the new State Judaized much of the occupied villages’ spatial 
history. “Palestine was not simply ‘baptized’ with Euro-Christian names,” as Nadia Abu-
El-Haj argues but also, “biblical names were understood to belong to the land itself and 
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to be eminently present and identifiable therein (once properly deciphered).”197 The 
Israeli former deputy mayor of Jerusalem, Mêrôn Benveniśtî wrote, “every Arabic name, 
even if no ancient Hebrew name had preceded it” was erased from the map, an act he 
equated with a “declaration of war” on Palestinian heritage, attributed to the Zionist 
“desire to make direct contact with their own ancient heritage”.198 Israel settler colonial 
nomenclature tries to superimpose its name over territory and places and this in turn 
constructs collective memories and traditions. The use of narratives of a past craft a sense 
of a collective present and future. As such, the ‘baptization’ of space remains always 
more than a mere reflections of reality, but it underwrites and reproduces Israel settler 
colonial power.     
Words to refer to places, events, and actions are critical building blocks in the 
linguistic repertoire of Zionist settler colonialism. Their terms of discourse naturalizes 
domination and “part of the taken-for-granted […] as if there were no other possible 
alternatives,” as Julie Peteet indicated.199 Creating a Jewish State requires an elaboration 
of an historical deep ties to the place and renaming is an axiomatic strategy to symbolize 
its settler colonial dynamics of the Judaisation of the land. These practices of remaking 
the spatial history of the land had indeed laid the ground for a terrain within which the 
practices of settler nationhood would take place and shape in the newly founded Jewish 
State.200 
Naming strategies continued in Jerusalem as excavations and restoration work 
damaged many Islamic and Christian buildings. With the Israeli occupation of East 
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Jerusalem in 1967, a residential area to the west of the Wailing Wall, called Haret al-
Maghariba or the Moroccan Quarter (established by Saladin’s son, Malik al-Afdal in 
1193), including four Muslim religious sites, was razed and forced 1000 residents to 
leave, “in order to create the large open plaza that now exists west of the wall.”201 Today, 
thousands of Israeli visitors and worshippers congregate in the site.  
Similar practices of cultural effacement were reported through international 
organizations. Since 1967 the old city of Nabulus witnessed a number of expropriations 
of mosques, churches, mausoleum, and historic houses. The Special Rapporteur of the 
Commission on Human Rights, John Dugard, reported “in Nablus 64 buildings in the Old 
City, including 22 residential buildings, were completely destroyed or badly damaged, 
and a further 221 buildings partially damaged.”202 In this vein, Amnesty International 
reported, “a number of religious or historical sites were partially destroyed or severely 
damaged in what frequently appeared to be wanton destruction without military 
necessity.”203 Destroying historical places has a two-pronged goals: first, to facilitate the 
indigeneity of the new Jewish settlers and second, to efface Palestinian history and 
presence and thus appropriates the land. In other words, it is pivotal in reinventing a 
nation, a place and identities. The reconstruction of a Jewish place or the practice of 
producing it, indigenizes Sephardic and Ashkenazi settlers. The Israeli minister of Trade 
and Industry, Pinchas Sapir, ordered in April 1968 the expropriation of twenty-nine acres 
of the southern part of the Old City “to develop the area to house Israeli Jewish families 
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and to reestablish a Jewish presence in the Old City.”204 These series of expropriation in 
the words of the former mayor of Jordanian East Jerusalem, Ruhi al-Khatib will render 
[and had indeed rendered]:  
Arabs in the City lose properties which have belonged to them for 
hundreds of years, and more than 6,000 Arabs will be evacuated from the 
city and dispersed… while more than 700 employers and workers will be 
deprived of their means of livelihood, and forced to swell the ranks of the 
homeless…205     
 
In the politics of settler colonialism buildings are replete with meaning. The primary 
motive for their destruction and the displacement of the local inhabitants, as Wolfe 
argues, is the territory.206 This remains a leading principle in the Israeli occupation of the 
U.N assigned territories of Palestine. Prior to 1967, Israel was restricted to the Green 
Line area (the 1949 armistice line), but afterwards it covered all of Israel/Palestine and 
continues until the present day through the Israeli legislature.207  
VII. Legal Dispossession     
Until the end of the British Mandate, land was purchased primarily by the Jewish 
National Fund (JNF) and other land-purchasing companies. This made 1.5 million 
dunams [1 dunam = 1000 m2] of Mandate Palestine’s 26.3 million dunams ‘Jewish 
owned’.208 In the aftermath of the war, enactment of new laws appropriated the 
dispossession and defined largely the ethno-national identity of the new settler society. 
Between 1948 and 1960, the Israelis authorities increasingly established legal structures 
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to seize, retain, and reclassify the Arab lands appropriated by the state.209 While there is 
no unanimous estimate of the total dunams expropriated, the post 1948 war witnessed a 
massive land confiscation. According to a 1951 study of the U.N Conciliation 
Commission for Palestine (UNCCP), the 1948 war cost the Palestinian Arabs 16.3 
million dunams (almost 4 million acres), including public and privately owned land. 
However, the 1964 UNCCP survey showed the expropriation of land a little over 7 
million dunams.210 This dispute over the accuracy of these numbers is reproduced also 
among the Arab and the Israeli researchers and organizations. While the former have 
limited the expropriations between 5.7 and 6.6 million dunams, the latter have estimated 
it from 4.2 to 6.5 million dunams.211  
In filling the space, the ruling Mapai party has settled the evacuated homes with 
Jewish settlers. By April 1949, they were 75,000 Jewish settlers living in the Arab 
quarters of mixed cities of Haifa, Safed, Jaffa, and Jerusalem; 16,000 in the abandoned 
Arab cities of Ramle, Lydda, and Acre; and a little over 18,000 in evacuated Arab 
villages.212 These practices of land expropriation began almost immediately, with the 
repeated reclassification of the land, first as ‘abandoned land’, then as ‘absentee land’, 
and finally as ‘Israel Lands.’213 Territorial conquest is validated through legal 
mechanisms. The Israeli tactics of land expropriation deployed four mechanisms of 
                                                 
209Geremy, Forman & Alexander, Kedar, 309. 
210 Michael R. Fishbach’s book Records of Dispossession: Palestinian Refugee Property and the Arab-
Israeli Conflict (New York, N.Y: Institute for Palestine Studies and Columbia University Press, 2003) uses 
an extensive documents from the UN committee reports, the Arab and the Israeli sources to trace the 
development of the Palestinian refugee problem and its convoluted legality. 
211Yifat, Holzman-gazit. Land Expropriation in Israel: Law, Culture and Society. (Burlington, VT: Ashgate 
Publishing Company, 2007): 104.  
212Ernest, Stock. Chosen instrument: The Jewish Agency in the First Decade of the State of Israel. (New 
York, N.Y: Herzl Press, 1988): 86. 
213 Forman & Alexander, “From Arab Land to ‘Israel Lands’: the Legal Dispossession of the Palestinians 
Displaced by Israel in the wake of 1948.” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 812. 
61 
 
control: purchasing land, occupying land outright, confiscating Arab land, and 
undermining the legality of traditional rules of inheritance.214    
Based on these practices, pro-Zionists Jews perceived the return of the Palestinian 
Arabs after 1948 a menace to their existence. From the birth of the new State, there was a 
fear that the overwhelming Arab majority would legally own the land and thus was 
reasonably “regarded as hostile to the State and the interests of the majority of its 
citizens.”215 To illustrate, the 1950 Absentees Property Law confiscated all Palestinians’ 
personal property prior to the war and placed them within the power of the Custodian of 
Absentee Property.216 Michael Fischbach estimates over half (more than 726,000) of the 
entire Palestinian population’s properties were legally seized without compensation.217 
Yet, the international law, U.N. Resolution 194 (III) Section 11) states that the “refugees 
wishing to return to their homes should be permitted to do so .... and that compensation 
should be paid for the property, of those choosing not to return and for loss of, or damage 
to, property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made 
good by the Governments or authorities responsible.”218 Israeli law stipulates that Jews 
from all over the world have the “right of return” while the right of return for Palestinians 
is internationally recognized yet denied by Israel. For Palestinian refugees, the ‘right of 
return’ is still imagined within the geographical space of Palestine, but the political 
arrangements have been profoundly reconfigured. 
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Another central example of the Israeli statutory of land expropriation is the Planning 
and Building Law of 1965.219 This law bans a Palestinian landowner who lives in East 
Jerusalem to use his own property without a building permit from the Israeli 
municipality. Many Palestinian Arabs were disenfranchised to use their own property 
since “there were no approved town planning schemes for Arab-owned land.”220 In other 
words, plan approval is defined along ethnic lines. It may take the Palestinian Arab as 
triple as the time it takes a new Jewish neighborhood to be approved. In 1967, out of 
70,500 dunams of Palestinian land annexed to Jerusalem, 25,000 dunams, or more than 
one-third, has been expropriated for the construction of new Jewish settlements and of the 
approximately 46,000 dunams of land the Arabs still own, only 23,000 dunams have been 
planned. This means that half of Palestinian lands were frozen and could not be used.221 
Even among the 23,000 planned, less than one third, or 7,500 dunams, has been 
designated as residential land, making Palestinian Arabs have the right to live on less 
than 10 percent of their land.222 
The post-1948 Israeli governments have not used the law only to appropriate the land 
confiscation of Palestinian refugees, living outside Israel’s borders, but also to alienate 
the country’s internal Arab minority as well. Since 1948, treatment of the Palestinian 
Arabs irrespective of where they are, has “gone relatively unchanged.”223 The settler 
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colonial system, as embedded in the Zionist practices, has delegitimized the grievances of 
the Palestinian Arabs even though methods of alienation differ nonetheless from the Arab 
Israeli citizens.  
     Reflections: 
This chapter examined the foundational structures of the new settler society in 1948 
and how it perpetuated through the 1960s. It explored how the colonial discursive 
strategy of emptying the land conceptually, practices of depopulation, Judaisation, and 
legal dispossession have validated Israel’s new settler society. Herzlian prophecy of 
creating a Jewish State was indeed “beneficial” for some, but definitely, in Hannah 
Arendt’s words, “a recipe for disaster.”224 Zionism, the political ideology which calls for 
the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine, triggered this “disaster.” Just as two natives 
cannot occupy the same territory and claim origins and sovereignty neither can there be 
two victims making a claim for their narrative and memories to prevail.225 Zionist settler 
colonial project in Palestine from its inception to the 1960s may have been nearly fifty 
years in the past, but its foundational structures still define today’s Israel settler colonial 
dynamics and are everywhere to be seen. Its legacy demonstrates the centrality of settler 
colonialism and features today in the expropriated lands in various parts of the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip, as well as in East Jerusalem, in the blockade of Gaza, in the 
Wall of separation, in the increasing number of Jewish  settlements in the West Bank and 
the displacement of thousands of Palestinians in refugee camps, in the Judaisation of the 
Palestinian lands, in the control of Palestinian economy and in the denial of the 
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Palestinian ‘right of return’. Settler colonial rule has, no simple solutions, for it is usually 
impossible to repair the injustice done to one party without causing grave injustice to the 
other. Not sure, however, if there is a way out of this imbroglio?   
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Conclusion: Are the Dakota and the Palestinians’ Plight Comparable? 
              Settler colonialism is not about shaming or ‘guilting’ or blaming. It is about 
acknowledging the truth, and with that acknowledgment will come reconciliation, healing, 
empowerment and pride… It is a mistake to think of Indigenous rights and well-being as merely 
an ‘Indigenous issue’ or ‘Indigenous problem.’226 
 
Although settler colonial studies reveal similar histories evolving at different times 
and at different spaces, they reproduce more universal structures of settler colonialism. 
The latter was a “winner-takes-all proposition” that demanded land in Minnesota and still 
does in Israel to the detriment of the indigenous peoples.227 In Minnesota, the white 
settlers devastatingly dispossessed the Dakota and assaulted their culture. In Israel, the 
two wars of 1948 and 1967 expelled thousands of Palestinians, confiscated their 
properties and brought Jewish settlers into the emptied lands. Both settler colonial 
enterprises in Minnesota and Israel aimed to subordinate and destroy the way of life of 
the Dakota and the Palestinians, respectively. Yet, indigenous resistance made settler 
colonialism appear less violent and destructive and helped shift the paradigm from settler 
violence to indigenous guilt.228 Like the Dakota people, the Palestinians responded to 
settler violence by fleeing and/or fighting, as constant encroachment and other forms of 
colonial repression escalated. This escalation made both nations suffer substantial 
destruction, retaining only a fraction of original land.  
Infuriated by a sense of betrayal over the signing of various treaties in 1851, the 
decline of food sources, the delay in the payment of annuities, and the indifference of 
United States agents, the Dakota rose under the leadership of Little Crow to take the 
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white settlers in the Minnesota Valley by surprise. As reservation confinement entered its 
second decade, the Dakota living under a postcolonial colonial regime declared war 
against the US government and its citizens. When resistance peaked during the US-
Dakota War of 1862, General John Pope wrote to General Henry Sibley:   
   We have now the means to make a final settlement with all these Indians. 
The opportunity may not occur again.... Let me again say to you that I 
regard the destruction of everything that can sustain life between Fort 
Ridgely and Big Stone Lake as very important.... All annuity Indians must 
be notified that hereafter they will not be permitted on any pre-text to 
leave their reservation that all the soldiers have orders to shoot them 
wherever they are found, and citizens are authorized to do the same.229 
 
Sibley designed his ‘final settlement’ based on a colonial ideology of ‘alienation’ and 
‘dehumanization’ of the locals—being ‘savages’ and ‘heathens’ to assert a claim to land, 
ghettoize the Dakota and promulgate the concomitant indigenization of the new settlers. 
However, it came at the expense of a ninety-eight percent rate of the Dakota 
extermination.230 From beginning to end, the Sioux outbreak of 1862 was a tragic and 
brutal episode in the history of postcolonial Indian-white relations in the new republic. 
With their way of life under the threat of extension, the Dakota were committed to push 
settlers out of the Minnesota River valley and take their land back. There resistance 
ended with two major phases of elimination: first, trials and executions of 38 and second, 
mass deportation of more than 300 Dakota to other states, such as Iowa. 
In sharp contrast, Zionists constructed their own narrative to accompany the 
construction of Jewish settlements after the 1948 and 1967 wars. This narrative presented 
the Zionists as a unique and impregnable force that would displace Palestinian Arabs. 
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The politics of settler colonialism in Palestine—forced depopulation, land confiscation, 
cultural effacement, legal appropriation—have transformed substantial parts of 
Palestinian lands into a Jewish State. For example, the conquest of Lydda and other cities 
and towns in July 1948 forced thousands of its inhabitants to flee, leaving the door open 
for hundreds of new Jewish immigrants to flock the town and transform Lydda within 
few days into a Jewish settler colony. Henceforth, Israel’s destruction of Palestinian 
collective memories and the imposition of Hebrew names (‘baptization’) has a two-
pronged goal: first, to facilitate the indigeneity of the new Jewish settlers and second, to 
efface Palestinian history and thus appropriate the land. Moreover, the post-1948 Israeli 
governments have used laws such as the 1950 Absentees Property Law and the Planning 
and Building Law of 1965 not only to confiscate the land of Palestinian refugees, living 
outside Israel’s borders, but also to alienate the country’s internal Arab minority as well.  
As my comparison has shown, settler colonialism is a process that acts similarly 
across time and space and the end result of both practices of settler colonialism in 
Minnesota and Israel is quite similar—territoriality. The elimination of the Dakota and 
the exclusion of the Palestinians were largely land-based, which would provide a good 
parallel about the need for settlers to expand their land base. In retrospect, both the 
Dakota people and the Palestinian refugees cherish a tradition of a day when their return 
to their lands will eventually come. While the Dakota dream of restoring their life of 
hunting the buffalo in the Dakota Territory, the Palestinians’ yearning to return to Lydda 
and to other dozens of towns that vanished during the cataclysmic year of 1948 linger at 
the core of the Palestinians’ plight. These ambitions of national resuscitation are often 
met with white settlers’ feeling of paternalism and outright hatred.   
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Studying American history within the context of both settler colonialism and 
postcolonialism has been fairly controversial. American historians until 1960s typically 
presented the 1862 war (and nineteenth century wars on the frontier in general), as 
America’s “winning of the West,” an expansion deemed a “good” to spread across the 
continent and supplant the less developed, “savage” native inhabitants. On the other 
hand, although the historiographical debate of the 1948 war roiled Israeli society, 
“revisionist” historians were often met with denunciation and marginalization because of 
Israeli assumption of the existence of a true and immutable sacred past.231 While 
conventional view of the both histories reaffirm the indigeneity of the settlers, it 
delegitimizes indigenous past.232 Anna Johnston and Alan Lawson argue, “The settlers 
seek to establish a nation, and therefore need to become native and to write the epic of the 
nation’s origin.” They continue, “The ‘origin’ is that which has no antecedent, so the 
presence of Ab-origines is an impediment.”233 In other words, creating the indigene has a 
two-fold task: first, cleansing the land through killing or marginalization and second, 
sanitizing historical record. The evidence in the case of the Dakota War in 1862 and the 
Palestinians’ war in 1948 clearly upholds the former task.  
There is always a need for historical questioning of the colonial situation in order to 
decolonize our history. As Fanon states, “we might find it in the well-known words: ‘The 
last shall be first and the first last.’ Decolonization is the putting into practice of this 
sentence.”234 To do otherwise qualifies historians “as co-perpetrators, and ‘accessories to 
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the crime,’ the bearers of the onus of what the Germans call “Mitschuld,” i.e., 
complicity,” as Professor Vahakn Dadrian posits.235 If it took the United States Federal 
Government almost a century to apologize for its long history of official depredations and 
its ill-conceived policies toward the Dakota and Indian tribes, how long will it take Israel 
to do justice to the plight of the Palestinians?236       
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